Abstract Low-density urbanization, also known as urban sprawl, has accelerated in the United States in recent years, In this article I will test the cumulative influence of locally adopted (municipal) landuse controls on sprawl. Land-use controls that shift the cost of development onto builders and away from the general public arc found to reduce sprawl; those that mandate low densities are found cumulatively to increase sprawl, whereas urban containment systems have limited cumulative effects. Further, regions whose local governments rely on ad valorem property taxes to fund services and infrastructure tend to sprawl more than those that rely on a broader tax base.
Introduction
In the decade between 1982 and 1992, over 13 million acres in the 48 contiguous states of the USA and Hawaii changed from forests, fields, and rangcland to urban uses, a remarkable increase in urban land of more than 25% (US Department of Agriculture, 1995) . Meanwhile, population increased by only 11% (US Bureau of the Census, 1996a; 1996b) . This extraordinary change manifests itself in reduced density: the population density of the average acre of land converted to urban use during this period was only 40% of the existing urban average in 1982. Following this decade of low-density conversion of land, concerns have rccmcrgcd over the cost of 'sprawl'.
Most of the public policies that encourage or limit low-density development (sprawl)-including fiscal arrangements, income-tax deductions for home-mortgage interest payments, and highway spending-emerge at the state or federal level. At the local level, however, municipalities, counties, and their residents can affect their development density by adopting land-use controls. Zoning, urban growth boundaries, building-permit limitations, residential moratoria, and infrastructure charges can all affect the pattern and density of new development. If state and local governments wish to promote more compact development, then they should be aware that some land-use controls may fight sprawl, whereas others promote it.
In the first section, a working definition of sprawl is developed. In the second section the literature on the causes of sprawl is reviewed, and in the third section the hypotheses tested by the current research are presented. In the fourth section, which presents the results of the current research, I first set the background, showing that population density is strongly and directly related to land values and that density is also related to metropolitan political organization, local government spending, and traffic congestion. After controlling for these four factors, the research provides strong evidence in support of my hypothesis that municipal and county land-use controls have cumulative effects on density. The results suggest, in particular, that local growth-management programs whose goals include compact development should concentrate on ways to make growth pay its own way, while discouraging low-density zoning and annual limits on residential building permits. extent of this subsidy and its impact on density reduction (Ewing, 1997; Gordon and Richardson, 1997a; 1997b) . Local governments also have a tradition of subsidizing new schools, roads, sewers, libraries, and other facilities by floating general obligation bonds that were repaid by higher property taxes on established residents. Many local governments in the USA continue to depend on property taxes for the majority or the plurality of their revenues, although this dependence has declined substantially on average in the past forty years.W Sprawl also has been connected with 'while flight*, that is, the desire of non-Hispanic whites to move away from minorities, especially African-Americans (Farley et al, 1978) . In recent years African-Americans have moved into the suburbs in increasing numbers (Schneider and Phelan, 1993; Stahura, 1986) , and metropolitan measures of segregation have declined in most regions (Farley and Frey, 1994) . Even so, the average distance between whites and blacks in the USA has remained high, as whites have moved farther into the suburbs and exurbs (Galster, 1991) .
Several forms of fragmentation have been suggested as additional contributors to sprawl. First, fragmentation of farm ownership leads to a more scattered development pattern than would otherwise occur because farmers' decisions about when to sell for development do not necessarily coincide with their neighbors'decisions. Land in one large ownership can be planned for a relatively high density of development, as suggested by Pciscr (1984) and by the experience of the Irvine, California, and Columbia, Maryland, new towns (Hoppcnfcld, 1967) .
Columbia and Irvine also illustrate the effects of a second kind of fragmentation: municipal fragmentation. Columbia, an unincorporated settlement in Howard County, has been built out much as planned, in part because, although early residents wished to preserve the open space that would later turn into additional housing, they could not incorporate and wrest control from county-level decisionmakers (Craig, 1996; Tenncnbaum, 1996) . Development plans for Irvine, by contrast, were scaled back after growth-control advocates won a majority of scats on the first city council after incorporation in 1971 (Schiesl, 1991, page 73) . More generally, intermunicipal competition can lead to sprawl for several reasons. For instance, the metropolitan public economy school (Bish, 1971; Schneider, 1989; Tiebout, 1956 ) has concentrated on the attempts of municipalities to limit new entrants and thereby limit the Tree rider' problem. Presumably, the nonentrants must live somewhere else. When a county includes only a few municipalities, however, few fiscal incentives exist for such exclusionary behavior.
Finally, local governments' land-use policies have been hypothesized, and sometimes found, to influence land-use patterns. Fischel (1990) cites work by Moss (1977) and Sheppard (1988) which shows that suburban development constraints probably induce sprawl. Chinitz (1990, page 7) , on the contrary, contends that "the direct line that some people have drawn from growth management through urban sprawl to greater automobile usage and its adverse consequences for the environment is fraught with fallacy". Displaced growth could go to infill locations, not farther into the exurbs.
The spatial effects of land-use controls probably depend on the type of control. Zoning for large lots, limiting issuance of building permits, and establishing moratoria on development, for instance, can limit the supply of new housing in the jurisdictions that impose them;
(2) Demand for housing that goes unsatisfied because of the control W According to data from the US Government's Census department, local governments across the United States acquired about a quarter off their revenues from property taxes in fiscal year 1994-95, compared with 48% in 1962 (US Bureau of ^^ in six states still depend on property taxes for more than half of their revenues, on average.
(2) In practice, growth controls do not always really control growth (Landis, 1992; Warner and Molotch, 1995) .
will probably be satisfied in another location but empirical studies provide mixed evidence on whether development will occur as infill in existing urbanized areas or as sprawl in newly developed areas. Shen (1996) estimated the population that would have resulted by 1990 in 124 zones of the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area in the absence of any growth control. When he compared this 'unrestricted' outcome to the pattern observed with growth controls, he found that annual limitations on building-permit issuance reduced population growth by over 10%. Cumulatively, these permit caps dislocated more than 20% of the region's population but Shen's maps suggest that the displaced residents found housing not only in outlying Solano County but also in close-in locations on the eastern shore of San Francisco Bay (Shen, 1996, page 83) . In another estuarine case study, Feitelson (1993) concluded that laws protecting Chesapeake Bay would probably not cause sprawl because infill housing could still be built close to the water. Reduction of sprawl is the goal of other land-use controls. Urban growth boundaries, for example, are supposed to create more compact urban areas (Nelson and Duncan, 1995, chapter 6) . Studies of Oregon's growth boundaries (ECO Northwest et al, 1991; Knaap, 1985) show that they have contributed to increased density in some metropolitan areas, but only when coupled with local zoning ordinances that preclude suburban development outside the boundary and encourage smaller lot sizes inside. The growth boundary system in Oregon presupposes that all jurisdictions act in concert to adopt growth boundaries. The effects of urban growth boundaries adopted piecemeal by municipalities within a region are unclear; like other land-use controls tested by Shen (1996) and Feitelson (1993) , they may displace growth to outlying areas, encourage infill, both, or neither.
Insofar as sprawl is subsidized, the best way to stop it may be to make growth 'pay its own way', as has become common in California since the passage of Proposition 13 (Landis, 1995) . Local governments have developed ever more elaborate systems to replace property-tax revenue with charges to developers for the schools, parks, roads, police and fire stations, storm-water infrastructure, libraries, and other urban systems that require construction to maintain a given service level as the population increases. These 'adequate public facilities ordinances', or APFOs (White, 1996) , sometimes adopted in parallel with development impact fees, should promote higher densities and discourage sprawl as landowners and consumers both seek economies in land.
Hypotheses and data
As suggested earlier, the measurement of sprawl is not straightforward, partly because of the variation in how sprawl is defined. Conceptual difficulties aside, calculation of urban density has been difficult nationally in the USA because the nation has not historically collected much data on the spatial extent of urban development. In recent years, however, the US Department of Agriculture has made available its National Resources Inventory (NRI) (US Department of Agriculture, 1995) for research purposes; the NRI, a spatial survey conducted every five years, includes data on major categories of land use for nonfederally owned land. In this article I take advantage of the NRI to develop a measure of sprawl (which, to be more accurate, is a measure of density): the change in county population between 1982 and 1992, as estimated by the US Census (US Bureau of the Census, 1996a; 1996b) , divided by the change in urbanized acres of land over the same period as estimated in the NRI. This measure is the dependent variable for this study.
The independent variables in this research listed in Census, 1985; 1996a; 1996b; 1998 and minority population. The table shows hypothesized effects of these variables upon the dependent variable, along with the sources for all data used in the study. I collected land-use control variables in a survey of 1510 jurisdictions in the 25 largest metropolitan areas'of the USA. The survey, to which 1168 jurisdictions (77%) responded, asked local planners, engineers, and other knowledgeable informants about the presence or absence of a series of,land-use controls, including zoning, urban growth boundaries, permit moratoria, building-permit caps, and APFOs. I used these responses to calculate the proportion of the land area of responding jurisdictions to which a particular land-use control applied. Say, for instance, that 10 of the 15 jurisdictions in a county responded to the survey. If one jurisdiction with 10 square, miles employed a building-permit cap, and nine other jurisdictions with a total of 90 square miles did not, then we would assume that 10% of the entire county was controlled with building-permit caps:
In all, the 25 metropolitan areas surveyed included 180 counties in 24 states and the District of Columbia. In this article only the 159 counties that gained population between 1982 and 1992 are analyzed; it is assumed that the reasons for density changes in these counties differ from those in counties where the population fell. The 159 growing counties added 12.2 million residents and 3.2 million acres of urbanized land between 1982 and 1992/ 3 > My study tests seven bundles of hypotheses regarding the density of new development. In brief, the seven contentions are that land use will be more dense (less sprawling) if: (1) appropriate land-use controls are in place and others are absent; (2) farms produce valuable products; (3) municipal fragmentation is limited; (4) housing prices are high; (5) local governments do not rely heavily on property taxes to finance public services and infrastructure; (6) transportation accounts for smaller proportions of public spending; and (7) the proportion of black residents is lower, and that of Hispanic residents is higher.
The first set of explanatory variables concerns land-use regulation. We measure the percentage of land area under control by various methods. By hypothesis, APFOs will increase compactness. They mandate that infrastructure capacity remain at particular levels of service and require developers to pay for the expansions needed to accommodate new growth. Developers and landowners will respond by using land more efficiently, that is, at higher densities. Low-density-only zoning, building-permit caps, and moratoria, in contrast, will reduce compactness (that is, they will fuel sprawl). Urban growth boundaries may either fuel sprawl or encourage compactness (for elaboration, see Feitelson, 1993; Nelson and Duncan, 1995) .
The second set of explanatory variables concerns farm characteristics: value of farm products per acre, average farm size, and the number of farms in the county. Development in counties with more productive farmland should be relatively compact because farmers will outbid developers more frequently. Similarly, larger farms, and smaller numbers of farms, might be thought to encourage less scattered development because the owners of such farms will be more able to maximize the values of land converted to urban use. Large holdings, however, may also represent easy targets in the political process. Their owners may be forced to make more concessions than the combined owners of numerous small holdings, resulting in lower density development.
The third set of explanatory variables concerns metropolitan fragmentation. By hypothesis, metropolitan areas dominated by physically extensive jurisdictions and those with fewer municipalities will be more compact. More extensive municipalities and counties are more likely to phase development and make other decisions that will reduce service costs. Two metropolitan fragmentation variables are included: the area in square kilometers of the 25th-percentile jurisdiction (that is, the size of the jurisdiction at which 75% of the jurisdictions are larger and 25% smaller), and the number of municipal and county jurisdictions.^ To obtain these variables, I used the 1990 US Census of Population and Housing, which supplies information about the incorporation of places, and supplemented it with research on powers to regulate land use at the county, township (town), and city or village level.
(3) Twenty-one counties lost population; their cumulative population fell by 700 000 (3.4%), while their urbanized area increased by about 200 000 acres (6.4%). All 21 counties added at least some urbanized land. < 4 > The 25th percentile is used primarily because the average and median jurisdiction sizes were collinear with other dependent variables. The maximum absolute value of any of the Pearson's R coefficients of the independent variable matrix is 0.38; the complete matrix is available from the author on request.
The fourth variable set concerns housing prices. High and rapidly growing housing prices should promote more compact development because high house prices translate backward to high land prices, and high land prices promote higher densities. Median house values from 1980, as reported by owners, and the percentage change in median house values between 1980 and 1990, were obtained from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population and Housing.
The fifth hypothesis, on local government spending, is that high debt and heavy reliance on property taxes promote less compact development. These characteristics of government fiscal policy indicate that current residents are paying to subsidize new growth. Data for all jurisdictions (debt per capita and reliance on property tax per capita) were obtained from the Census of Governments via the USA Counties CD-ROM.
Sixth, transportation infrastructure is hypothesized to affect the density of land development in the following ways. Areas with long commute times (average travel time to work in minutes) should become more compact as households look for opportunities to live closer to their jobs. Heavy highway spending in local budgets should be associated with less compact development, if we assume that more highways facilitate population dispersion. Data for commute time arc taken from the 1980 Census of Population and Housing, and those for local highway spending arc taken from the Census of Governments.
The seventh set of hypotheses concerns minority population (percent non-Hispanic black, percent Hispanic). The 'white flight' hypothesis suggests that regions with higher proportions of black residents would become less compact. Large proportions of Hispanics, in contrast, are hypothesized to encourage more compact development because regions where Hispanics concentrate attracted most of the new Latino immigrants in the 1980s, and these immigrants tend to live more compactly than native-born residents (Myers ct al, 1996) .
Results
Among the 159 counties that gained population between 1982 and 1992, the mean county added about 3.4 new residents for every new urban acre (table 2) . San Francisco County, California, pulled this mean up from the median of 2.2; it added 61 new they did urban land; the population and urban-area growth rates were approximately equal in metropolitan Phoenix, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. At the other end of the sprawl continuum were Boston, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and New York, which spread over twice as fast as they added population. The wide variety among metropolitan areas is paralleled even within some states, adding interest to the multivariate regression that follows in the next section. How can we explain the differences in the efficiency of new urbanization in a convincing fashion?
Lund-use controls The ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions provide strong support for several hypotheses about the connection between land-use controls and the density of new development. The regressions also fit the data very well, explaining over 90% of the variation in the value of the dependent variable (table 4, see over). I hypothesized that APFOs-which require new development to pay its own way -encourage higher density in new development. The results arc consistent with this hypothesis: for every 10% of a county's land area controlled by an APFO, its density increased by about 9 new residents for every 100 new urban acres. In the average county, 18% of the land area was subject to APFOs. [ Table 5 (see over) shows means and standard deviations for all the variables.] Because all the land-use controls affected very little or no land area in many counties while affecting more than 70% of the land area in others, a second model was developed by using dummy variables representing counties with more than 25% of the land area controlled, instead of using continuous variables. Counties with more than 25% of their land in jurisdictions with APFOs gained (on average) about 50 more new residents for every 100 new urban acres than did counties with lower APFO coverage. (The two-tailed significance of this estimate is only 0.18, but because the research hypothesis specified a direction this result can be reported at better than 90% confidence.) It is of course possible that areas with high development pressure will be more likely to enact APFOs but a more reasonable interpretation is that APFOs promote density.
Low-density-only zoning and building-permit caps, unlike APFOs, are associated with more sprawl (table 4). For every additional 10% of land in low-density-only jurisdictions, a county had 13 fewer new residents per 100 new urban acres. The typical county with over a quarter of its area in low-density-only jurisdictions had about 113 fewer new residents for every 100 new urban acres than did the typical county where low-density-only zoning was less prevalent. In the average county, 20% of the land area was subject to low-density-only zoning, and 25% of counties had more than a quarter of their land under this control (table 4). Building-permit caps, which are much less common (table 5), had a greater influence than low-density-only zoning. For every additional 10% of land occupied by jurisdictions with permit caps, the average density dropped by 30 new people per 100 new urban acres. The typical county with more than 25% of its area subject to permit caps had 232 fewer people per 100 new urban acres than that with less area subject to permit caps. Neither urban growth boundaries nor moratoria have a significant effect on sprawl at better than a 90% confidence level.
Other control variables The value of farm products sold per acre of farmland is by far the most important variable related to sprawl versus compactness. Every additional $1000 of productivity in 1982 was associated with about 70 new residents per 100 new urban acres between 1982 and 1992. Neither average farm size nor the number of farms attained significance at the conventional 90%> confidence level but the number of farms was close to significance, its positive sign suggesting that more farms may encourage compactness.
As hypothesized, jurisdiction size was associated directly with compactness. Some counties have many jurisdictions with little land area; such counties tended to grow less Housing values, which parallel land values, also led to more compactness between 1982 and 1992. All else being equal, a county with a median house value of $150000 in 1980 would have added close to 30 people more for every 100 acres of new urban land than a county with a median value of $100000; a county whose median value a Property-tax reliance is the local government spending divided by property-tax revenues. * Significant at /? < 0.10 (two-tailed); ** significant at p = 0.10 (one-tailed) where research hypothesis specifies direction of association consistent with sign on observed coefficient. gained 100% during the 1980s would have added between 50 and 60 people for every 100 acres of new urban land.
Per capita indebtedness and reliance on property tax were both associated with sprawl. With every increase of $1000 in its local government debt in 1981, a county added 35 fewer new residents per 100 new urban acres. For every percentage point increase in the average county property-tax dependence (property taxes as a percentage of local government expenditures) in 1981, the county added about 7 fewer new residents per 100 new urban acres. Percentage of population non-Hispanic black Percentage of population Hispanic N = 159, except for property-tax reliance (N = 158) Note: N is the number of observations.
Longer commute times in 1980 contributed to compactness in new development. For every additional minute in a county's average commute time in 1980, it gained about 9 additional new residents per 100 new urban acres. Local spending on highways as a percentage of all local spending had no significant effect on compactness; other transportation variables, such as road miles per capita or per land area, may better represent the availability and importance of transportation infrastructure and may be tested in future research.
Counties with high proportions of Hispanic residents in 1980 also grew considerably more compactly in the 1980s than did counties with few Hispanic residents. A county whose population was 20% Hispanic in 1980, for example, would have gained 170 more persons per 100 new urban acres in the 1980s than a county with 10% Hispanic residents. The non-Hispanic black population did not have a significant effect on sprawl. Caveats ami limitations At least three main limitations must be discussed that qualify the conclusions that follow. First, the unit of analysis-the county-usually consists of multiple jurisdictions, each of which makes individual decisions on land use. The county is in some cases therefore an arbitrary unit of analysis chosen out of the necessity imposed by available data; a different aggregation of jurisdictions, or no aggregation at all, may result in different conclusions regarding land-use controls and urban density. Second, the land-use data do not allow investigation of densification or of decline and dedensification in previously urbanized areas. If previously urbanized areas became denser between 1982 and 1992, then the newly urbanized areas would have been growing even less compactly than registered here; conversely, population movement from previously urbanized areas to new urban areas within the same county would result in more compact new urbanization. Third, nonlinear regression forms were not tested, and other untested variables-for example, better measures of transportation and infrastructure investment-may provide more satisfactory explanations than some of the weakly significant ones reported here (such as APFOs and jurisdiction size) for some of the variation in urban density differences.
Discussion
In 1982, 5.4 persons lived on the average urban acre in these 159 growing counties. By 1992, that population density had slipped to just 5.0 persons per acre, after a decade of urbanization at densities averaging 3.8 people per acre. Although California, Maryland, and Arizona maintained or increased their historic population density in the 1980s, in all other states the density decreased. Had all the states simply maintained their 1982 density throughout the 1980s, these metropolitan areas would have required 900000 fewer acres for urbanization, more than a quarter of the 3.2 million acres actually newly urbanized. Some counties in these metropolitan areas were excluded from the analysis because they lost population. Even those counties in which the population declined experienced growth in urbanized area between 1982 and 1992, suggesting even more sprawl than is suggested by the statistics presented here.
Public policy very clearly and importantly affects sprawl. It matters how local governments pay for new growth. Counties widely covered with adequate public facilities ordinances, which require that developers maintain the level of service in major off-site infrastructure systems, grew more compactly than those without APFOs. High levels of public debt and heavy reliance on property taxes, both of which may indicate that established residents subsidize new development, are associated with more sprawl. These findings make intuitive sense and agree with other indications that local development charges produce more efficient land-use patterns (Landis, 1995) . They also support the 'concurrency' principle underlying Florida's growth-management legislation (De Grove, 1984) , which sets capacity prerequisites for infrastructure in new development. In practice, concurrency has fueled sprawl in some places because the Legislature neither required new development to pay the entire cost of all new highway construction nor required the provision of supplementary funding from state sources. Under these conditions, developers have often moved outward instead of selecting passed-over urban locations (Nelson and Duncan, 1995, pages 96-97) .
Fiscal arrangements are not entirely subject to local decisions. Many states limit the ability of local governments to charge developers the full cost of infrastructure required to serve new development. The findings of my research suggest that these limitations may come under increasing pressure from local governments. As this research has shown, counties sprawl more when their municipalities depend heavily on property taxes. Because sprawl costs more to serve with public facilities than compact development, municipalities dependent on property tax pay more for public services than other municipalities. When counties sprawl, they also experience rapid invasion by urbanities and suburbanites of rural areas and exurbs, where established residents are accustomed to (and usually satisfied with) lower levels of public services (Davis et al, 1994) . The new residents are likely to demand higher quality services. Thus local governments face fiscal pressure on two fronts, from the development pattern and from the nature of goods demanded.
Local governments in low-density areas may respond to the spiral of growth and higher service costs in a combination of ways. They may raise tax rates or they may allow the quality of public services to decline. Either of these alternatives is less politically palatable, however, than heightened efforts to control growth, which may in fact be politically appealing. By reducing residential density, local governments believe they can increase the quality and cost of new houses, perhaps attracting 'empty-nesters' who will place fewer demands on the school system. Density reduction also theoretically places an upper bound on population. Annual caps on building permits may not place such an upper limit on the ultimate population but they can theoretically stabilize annual property-tax increases.
Such responses as low-density zoning and building-permit caps impose heavy penalties. This research shows that both of these land-use controls reduce the density of new urbanization. They may have this effect for cumulative reasons. The land-use policies of each jurisdiction will affect those of its neighbors. It is well established that building-permit caps are adopted by neighboring jurisdictions in quick sequence (Glickfield and Levine, 1992) . The same may hold for other controls. This neighborhood effect may in fact promote sprawl in counties whose smallest jurisdictions (the 25th percentile was tested here) are very small. Moreover, the fiscal climate to which one locality responds affects all municipalities in a state.
The sprawl-inducing effects of low-density-only zoning and building-permit caps raise serious questions about their validity for widespread use in urban planning. Previous research (Pendall, 1995) has shown that both of these controls also exacerbate racial and ethnic divisions. Between 1980 and 1990, low-density-only zoning reduced the construction of attached and rental housing, contributing to higher rents and reducing the proportion of new Hispanic and black residents in the jurisdictions thus zoned. Jurisdictions with building-permit caps had falling proportions of Hispanic residents, although the caps did not appear in the previous research to have a direct effect on local housing markets. It is explained here that this might happen because permit caps reduce population density at the county scale. Such density reductions may be enough to raise development costs or hinder housing construction and thereby to reduce Hispanic populations in individual jurisdictions. Urban sprawl and exclusion of racial and ethnic groups doubly delegitimize these two land-use controls. Gordon and Richardson (1997a; 1997b) repeatedly make a case in support of 'suburban development', a term they favor over 'sprawl'. For the most part, their arguments rest on the presumption that suburban form results almost entirely from consumer preferences for low residential densities. They acknowledge that auto travel is subsized but discount the importance of these subsidies in comparison with mass-transit subsidies. To bolster their argument that consumer preferences are more powerful than government actions, they even contend that reform of local land-use controls such as zoning would likely have little "more than a negligible impact on densities and spatial patterns" (Gordon and Richardson, 1997a, page 97) . If consumer preferences are the principal engine fueling decentralization, and if one supports consumer sovereignty to the exclusion of most other considerations (which Gordon and Richardson do), then the natural recommendation is not to force development to become more compact than it already is.
The research reported here qualifies the contentions of Gordon and Richardson in at least three ways, First, the analysis shows that land-use controls do influence the density of new development; at least two of these controls reduce population outright, and one, tow-density-only zoning, also directly influences the kinds of dwellings that can he built. This condition violates the assumption made by Gordon and Richardson that consumer sovereignty is mostly unfettered in the United States. Second, the research provides evidence that fiscal arrangements influence density; when development pays its own way, it makes more efficient (that is f compact) use of land. My findings are equally supportive of market-based solutions but not of the presumption that government actions do little to influence density This second conclusion suggests that analysts are not misguided when they investigate how government actions influence consumer preferences.
Third, my research shows that the California regions whose development patterns Gordon and Richardson use as a touchstone are not only dense; they arc becoming more so, while other regions arc developing at densities much lower than they ever have before. Gordon and Richardson acknowledge this fact (1997b, page 276) but do not explore its broader meaning. The increasing density in some metropolitan areas, as well as the wide variety among all the large US metropolitan areas, suggests that consumers arc accepting a wide range of alternative development patterns. It is interesting, given that people will pay more for something they prefer, that people pay so much more to live in high-density San Francisco and Los Angeles than in low-density Atlanta or Tampa. Gordon and Richardson provocatively ask: "Are compact cities a desirable planning goal?" (Gordon and Richardson, 1997a) . In this article I have presented at least one answer to that question: If we support consumer sovereignty, then, yes, more compact cities are a desirable planning goal.
Conclusions: land-use controls and sprawl How, then, might we move toward the planning goal of more compact cities? Many of the contributors to sprawl revealed in this research are beyond government control. State and local governments can do little to promote high-value agriculture in urban areas, raise housing prices, or resolve municipal fragmentation. But state and local governments can contribute to the goal in at least two important ways.
First, municipal fiscal arrangements can be affected by state governments (and only by state governments). In many states, statutes and case law limit the ability of their local governments to shift infrastructure costs onto new growth, reinforcing the property tax as the most important source of local general revenue. But residents throughout the United States have learned that they need not accept the increases in property taxes required to accommodate new residential development. Instead they can lobby their municipal governments to adopt such growth-limiting land-use controls as low-density zoning and building-permit caps. The result is more sprawl, and more exclusion of lowincome households and racial minorities. This trend will only continue until more state legislatures follow the lead of those in California, Maryland, Florida, and Arizona, and give their municipalities and counties more ability to make growth pay its own way. Such an infrastructure finance system may of course have its own undesirable exclusionary effects that legislatures will have to weigh against the salutary effects of infrastructure charges upon urban density and the undesirable effects of any alternative system. Second, local governments can take some steps against sprawl even without huge changes in the municipal public finance system. They can identify areas where higher densities are appropriate, create incentives for high-density development to occur there, and work in voluntary councils of government to coordinate land-use policies with neighboring jurisdictions. They can encourage redevelopment of underused and abandoned properties, identify locally owned tax-delinquent properties for rehabilitation and occupancy, and provide additional opportunities for mixed uses in urban and suburban neighborhoods. Even if undertaken piecemeal, these measures may promote more compact urban areas. If adopted as a broader program that includes a reduction in subsidies to new growth, they will undoubtedly reduce sprawl in coming generations.
